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Abstract—This work considers the case of system maintenance
where systems are already deployed and for which some faults
or security issues were not detected during the testing phase.
We propose an approach based on control theory that allows
for automatic generation of maintenance fixes. This approach
disables faulty or vulnerable system functionalities and requires
to instrument the system before deployment so that it can later
be monitored and interact with a supervisor at runtime. This
supervisor ensures some property designed after deployment
in order to avoid future executions of faulty or vulnerable
system functionalities. This property corresponds to a set of safe
behaviors described as a Finite State Machine. The computation
of supervisors can be performed automatically, relying on a
sound Supervisory Control Theory. We first introduce some basic
notions of Supervisory Control theory, then we present and
illustrate our approach which also relies on automatic models
extraction and instrumentation.
Index Terms—Software Control, Software Maintenance, Su-
pervisory Control Theory, Vulnerabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
This work deals with fixing or patching faults and security
issues from software systems after deployment. We assume
that the systems under consideration went through the different
life cycle phases (design, implementation, testing, deployment)
and is now in maintenance phase. In this case, faults and
security issues that have not been detected during the testing
phase remain in the system and are reported whenever their
corresponding symptoms are observed by the users. Moreover,
we consider how deployed systems requires to act as quickly
as possible in order to generate and deploy a fix/patch for
an observed fault or vulnerability issue. In case of software
systems, the approach proposed in this paper offers a means to
automate the computation of a patch that prevent occurrences
of faulty behavior while maintaining the other system function-
alities. This approach represents a real benefit as it provides a
quick and reliable way of patching deployed systems, which
can then run safely until the release of a corrected version of
the source code.
This work is part of the EU FP7 FastFIX project [1].
FastFIX considers systems of industrial relevance and its
results will include a platform and a set of open source tools
to on-line monitoring of execution environments, gathering
semantic information on application and user behavior. Using
event correlation techniques, FastFIX aims to identify fail-
ure symptoms, performance degradation or changes in user
behavior and allows for failure replication, patch generation
and patch deployment, resulting in a self-healing software
application.
Self-healing software is a concept derived from the Auto-
nomic Computing community. Autonomic Computing is an
IBM initiative described in [2]. The authors envision systems
that follow biological principles and are able to manage
themselves. One of the interesting properties that an autonomic
system should possess is self-healing. Self-healing represents
the ability for a system to automatically recover from attacks
or malfunctions and is further discussed in e.g. [3], [4].
Control theory share some principles with autonomic com-
puting and is considered in this work. Previous works on
software control have been investigated in e.g. [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11]. The authors of [5] introduce an approach
for controlling software systems. The control acts on some
variables of the system. In [6] the authors consider the control
of communication between network nodes in order to ensure a
given level of performance. [8] also applies control techniques
in order to provide self-management properties to the system
for performance optimization purposes. In [7], the authors
consider control techniques in order to resolve conflicting
policies to be ensured on the system at runtime. An important
aspect of controlling systems is to ensure their stability, i.e.
demonstrating that the control achieves what the designer have
intended. As explained in [9], this is of great importance
whenever system self-management is considered, where the
system is left running without human intervention. This point
is also explained in [10] where the lack of understanding
of how automated actions affect system behavior is seen as
one of the main reasons why automatic approaches are not
more used. In this paper, we present an approach for software
patching by applying control theory techniques described
in [11]. This theory applies to formal models and provides
a formal description of the remaining behaviors of the system
under control.
In this work we consider a formal specification (possible
sequences of method calls) of both the system and the re-
quirements. Instead of proving that the system fulfills some
requirements, we control it in order to enforce them. This is of
particular interest whenever the system is already deployed and
modifying the application source code is not straightforward
(e.g. remote patching). Figure 1 positions our approach with
the development life cycle taken into consideration.
First, as our approach aims to possibly control the system
to be deployed, some models of the system need to be created
(automatically from the source code in our case) and the
system needs to be instrumented: addition of observation and
control points. These models and instrumentation are not used
until the system has been tested, verified and then deployed
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Fig. 1. Our approach with the development life cycle taken into consideration.
(these phases are not part of our approach but of the general
system life cycle). When the system is in use, new constraints
on the system behavior (control objectives) may appear to be
necessary, following for instance the occurrence of a fault or
the exploitation of some vulnerability. The previously created
model of the behavior of the system can then be combined with
the new behavior constraints in order to formally compute a
model of a supervisor that will monitor and restrict the system
behavior, using the previously implemented instrumentation.
This supervisor then controls the system at runtime, ensuring
the non-occurrences of previously observed the faults and
vulnerability exploitations.
The approach proposed in this paper is illustrated with
runtime exception issues as well as security issues such as
Buffer overflow (BOF). BOF attacks overwrite data buffers
and introduce wide ranges of attacks [12]. Mitigating BOF
vulnerabilities is a difficult task as BOF vulnerabilities appear
in the operational programs at runtime. One approach to detect
BOF attack is trough monitoring during program execution, so
to be able to prevent them and to send warnings to take actions
for avoiding the consequences of the possible exploitations
[12].
The content of this paper is structured as follows: as
our approach relies on the Supervisory Control Theory for
Discrete Event System initiated by [13], Section II presents
some background of this theory through examples. Then
our approach to automatically apply this theory to software
system is introduced in Section III. Section V provides some
discussions and research challenges.
II. BACKGROUND
The approach described in this paper relies on some auto-
nomic and self-healing principles and applies some control
theory in order to prevent futur vulnerability exploitations.
Brief background on both autonomic principles and control
theory on Discrete Event Systems are presented in Sec-
tions II-A and II-B.
A. Autonomic Systems
Self-adaptive systems possess the ability to adapt to changes
or situations. In particular, they can modify their configurations
or behavior in order to optimize or repair themselves.
Autonomic systems can be seen as another term referring
to self-adaptive systems. Historically, autonomic systems re-
ferred to biologically inspired systems, e.g. the human body
immune system. Software systems complexity is increasing
as well as the need to understand the varying environments
and frequently changing user needs. This leads to increased
overhead of maintaining and supporting them. These problems
motivate the need of autonomic software paradigm with so
called self-* properties such as self-healing, self-configuring,
self-managing, self-optimizing and so on.
To achieve the so called self-* capability the system needs
to continuously monitor its execution environment, input pa-
rameters and produce output. Moreover it needs to detect
requirements violations and to aid the system to switch to
(predefined) variants of its behaviours that allows restoring
requirements satisfaction. These different steps are usually
presented as the autonomic feedback loop. Figure 2 recalls the
one presented in [14] and shows that an autonomic system
must be able to observe itself and its environment, analyse
the collected data and have some knowledge about its proper
behavior in order to make decision on whether the current
observations are satisfying or whether some actions should be
performed in order to ensure proper behaviors of the system.
The analysis and decision part can be implemented in
separate module from the system itself, that must then be
able to observe and act onto the system. The system entry
points that allow for observation and action are respectively
called sensors and actuators. In our approach these points are
implemented through program instrumentation. The analysis
phase of Figure 2 corresponds to the automatic design of a su-
pervisor, applying control theory techniques, and the decision
phase corresponds to the application of that supervisor onto
the system at runtime.
B. Supervisory Control of Discrete Event Systems
As systems have become more and more complex, ensuring
that their behaviors fulfill given requirements is an important
challenge. Model checking techniques can be applied to check
whether system specifications ensure a given property. When
it is the case, then the specifications are satisfactory. When it
is not the case, the specifications have to be re-designed.
Fig. 2. The autonomic feedback loop as described in [14].
Supervisory Control of Discrete Event Systems ([13]) aims
to automatically design a model for a controller that is
able to prevent some of the behaviors of the system from
occurring. The obtained controller interacts with the system
to be supervised as illustrated in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3. The Control Feedback Loop.
Supervisory Control theory defines notions and techniques
that allow for existence and automatic computation of a model
of the controller, given a model of the system as well as a
property to be ensured.
Applying Supervisory Control techniques requires that a
model of the system is available. For Discrete Event Systems
(DES), languages over alphabets are often considered. For
a more practical aspects, Finite State Machine (FSM) are
considered1. An FSM is a 4-tuple (Σ, Q, q0, δ), where Σ is a
finite alphabet (set of events), Q a finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q
is the initial state of the FSM and δ : Q × Σ → Q is
the partial transition function. Intuitively, for a sequence of
events s ∈ Σ∗, s is a possible behavior of the system if
δ(q0, s) is defined. In this case, δ(q0, s) represents the state
that the system reaches after the sequence of event s occurred.
If this new state is marked, it usually means that sequence s
corresponds to the completeness of a task. For a state q, δ(q)
represents the set of events that can be triggered from state
q. Finally, the set of behaviors of system G is the language
generated by its FSM and is denoted L(G).
As shown in Figure 3, a supervisor can be seen as a function
that takes a given sequence s of the system and returns to the
system a set of allowed events after s. In some cases, it may be
desired that the behaviors of the system is restricted in order
to ensure a given property. Such a property may be modeled
as a FSM as well, generating a set of “safe” behaviors.
The main goal of the Supervisory Control theory is to
compute a new model of the system whose behaviors are all
included in the ones described by the control objective. In
order to achieve this, it will not be possible anymore to trigger
some events that could initially be triggered from the system.
However, it is usually unrealistic to assume that any type of
events can be disabled in such a way. If for instance, an event
corresponds to some sensor reading or the tic of a clock, then
it cannot be prevented from occurring.
In order to take such events into account, the alphabet of
the system is assumed to be composed of a set of controllable
events (Σc ⊆ Σ) and uncontrollable events (Σu ⊆ Σ). Each
event of the system is either controllable or uncontrollable.
Intuitively, uncontrollable events represents events that cannot
or should not be prevented from occurring.
Controlling a system consists of restricting its possible
behaviors. However this restriction must take into account the
1For simplicity and although languages are more general than FSM, we
only consider FSM here. Hence we reduce the argument to the case of regular
languages.
(a) An FSM modeling a system
which can perform 2 actions dur-
ing which failures can occur.
(b) A control objective stating that
a failure must not occur the first
time act1 is being performed.
Fig. 4. A system and a control objective.
controllable nature of the system events. In order to achieve
this, Ramadge and Wonham (see e.g. [11]) introduce a Con-
trollability property. A system G′ whose behaviors correspond
to a subset of the ones of G is controllable w.r.t Σu and G if
L(G′).Σu ∩ L(G) ⊆ L(G′) (1)
Where . represent the concatenation operator between
events. Ensuring the controllability of a subset of the behaviors
of a system ensures that the new model does not rely on
disabling uncontrollable events and is then practically feasible.
The basic supervisory control problem can then be stated as
the following:
Basic Supervisory Control Problem (BSCP): Given a
system G and a control objective K, compute the maximal
controllable set of behaviors included in the ones of both G
and K.
In this work, we consider solving the BSCP in case where
the system corresponds to a program and the control objective
corresponds to a set of behaviors that do not expose function-
alities with known vulnerabilities. Finally, it is worth noting
that it exists more problems that SC theory can tackle. Some
of these problems will be discussed in Section V.
Example 1: This example considers a system which can
perform two actions: act1 and act2. The set of possible
behaviors of the system is described in Figure 4(a). From
its initial state, the system can perform either act1 or act2.
If act1 is performed, then the system enters a state where
event end1 can be triggered. This corresponds to a proper
termination of act1, leading the system back into its initial state
where a choice between executing act1 or act2 can be made
again. However, a failure can also occur while performing act1,
leading the system into a deadlock state. A similar behavior
can be executed if act2 is performed.
In some cases, it may be required to modify the system
behaviors in order to fulfill some requirements. When such
modifications happen at the design phase, it can then be seen
as a model refinement before the system is implemented. If
such modifications need to be performed after the system is
implemented and deployed, then it can be seen as controlling
4the system. Similar to modeling the system behaviors, require-
ments can be expressed as Finite State Machines. Figure 4(b)
provides an example of such possible requirement (control
objective). This FSM states that once the system has started,
any event can be observed from it, however, if act1 is being
observed then end1 is the only event that can be observed
after this. Then any event can be observed again. Such a
control objective actually aims to enforce that a failure does
not happen the first time act1 is being performed.
Given a FSM of the system and the control objective,
Supervisory Control theory provides techniques for computing
a model of a supervisor that enforces the control objective,
taking into account that some events are not controllable.
Example 1, it is assumed that the event ’failure’ is not
controllable and Figure 5 represents a supervisor that ensures
the control objective presented in Figure 4(b). This supervisor
is actually the most permissive supervisor ensuring this control
objective, i.e. no smaller controllable behavior (as defined in
Equation 1) can be prevented by control while still ensuring
it.
This supervisor actually states that in order to prevent a
failure to occur the first time act1 is being performed, there is
no other alternative but to prevent act1 to be performed at all.
Therefore, in order to fulfill the control objective, the system
must be downgraded to only be able to perform act2.
end2
act2 failure
S
Fig. 5. A supervisor for system G and control objective K.
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III. APPROACH
In this section, we describe our approach to apply to soft-
ware maintenance some of the Supervisory Control principles
introduced in Section II-B. The approach proposed in this
work is described in Figure 6. It consists of 2 phases: one
off-line (at design phase) and one at runtime. At design
phase, the application is instrumented and a formal model
of the behavior of the system is computed. The application
model and instrumented application are then used at runtime
in order for a supervisor (i.e. patch) to be synthesized from
the application model and for the instrumented application
to interact with the synthesized supervisor. In our approach,
models are represented with Finite State Machines (FSM) and
the application model FSM is automatically extracted from the
source code2.
The instrumentation of the application and the model extrac-
tion are performed during the application development phase.
These actions prepare the application for control after deploy-
ment. Once the application is deployed and running, some
unexpected faults or security issues may occur. In this case,
2Actually, an over-approximation of the behaviors of the system are
extracted.
maintenance needs to be performed in order to fix/patch the
application. In our approach we consider expressing properties
(control objectives) that represent system behaviors that avoid
the observed occurrence of faults or security exploitation.
These control objectives can also be represented by Finite State
Machines.
This approach restricts behaviors as a means to system
patching, i.e. occurrences of faulty behaviors are prevented.
This makes it possible to automate the computation of behav-
iors to be prevented while maintaining the other functionalities
of the patched system. In case of software system, this
represents a real benefit as this approach provides a quick and
reliable way of patching deployed systems before releasing a
version with corrected source code.
Application
Source Code
Application
Model (FSM)
Control
Objective
(FSM)
Model of a
Supervisor
(FSM)
Instrumented
Code
Supervisor
/
Patch File
Model
Extraction Instrumentation
Runtime
ControlSupervisorSynthesis
Application
Development
Phase
After
Deployment
Fig. 6. Approach for automatic control of software
The Supervisory Control Theory presented in Section II-B
can be applied to the Finite State Machines of both the system
and the control objective, producing a FSM representing a
supervisor that can ensure the control objectives on the system.
Finally, the obtained supervisor can be encoded into a
patch file that is used by the instrumented application. This
supervisor can then control the application in order to avoid
the executions that lead to the previously observed faults or
security issues.
Finally whenever some method execution is disabled by a
supervisor, some alternative and systematic actions may be
taken. Figure 7 illustrates such a possible action where the user
is informed of the prevention of an execution due to control.
Fig. 7. Message indicating that control has been performed and functionality
disabled.
Section III-A introduces techniques that can be used to
extract Finite State Machines modeling the behavior of the
system from source code. Section III-B describes how the
5system can be instrumented in order to interact with the model
of the supervisor and Section IV illustrates the approach with
examples.
A. Model of the System and Requirements
In this paper, we consider Finite State Machines (FSM) to
model the behavior of the system as well as the properties to
be ensured by control. FSM possess a formal semantics and
can then be used for verification purposes in order to prove
or check properties about the system. Such an approach is
applied for model checking techniques and model checkers
such as SPIN (see e.g. [15]) rely on this formalism. In this
work, we consider control rather than verification, meaning
that a model of the system is 1) automatically modified in
order to ensure a given property and 2) that the obtained new
model represents a supervisor (also called a controller) that is
used to monitor and control the system at runtime as illustrated
in Figure 3.
Considering nowadays systems’ complexity, manually
building Finite State Machines that represent the system
behavior is tedious and error-prone. Therefore, approaches for
automatically extracting FSM from the system source code
have been considered. For instance, Bandera (see e.g. [16])
allows for model extraction from Java programs and can output
these models in different languages such as PROMELA ([17],
[18]).
The Finite State Machines considered by SPIN and Bandera
are actually more complex than the ones described in Sec-
tion II as they consider system variables. The different states
of the FSM correspond to different values of the variables
of the system. Although these FSM model the behaviors of
the system, they are state-oriented and their number of states
depends on the possible value range of the system variables.
More recently, the authors of [19] considered an approach
to extract FSM from several programming languages such as
Java and C. Their approach is behavior-oriented and consid-
ers method calls rather than system variables. The resulting
extraction process is lightweight and the size of the extracted
FSM remains reasonable for analysis. In [19], the analysis
performed consists of looking for patterns related to method
calls.
Our approach considers a similar view on what part of the
behavior of the system are represented by the FSM (method
calls rather than variables). However our approach requires
a model that is complete in terms of possible observation
that can be made at runtime. This is due to the fact that in
our approach, the model of the system (or the supervisor) is
not used for verification but rather at runtime for monitoring
and control. Verification only requires models that capture
information related to the property to be checked, while control
requires that every possible observation of the system made at
runtime is encoded in the supervisor.
In order to illustrate our approach, we describe how Finite
State Machines can represent the behavior of the system in
our context. Figure 8 presents some code sample and the
corresponding FSM extracted from this piece of code. The
method calls are extracted and correspond to the edges of
(a) An example of method decla-
ration.
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(b) An FSM modeling the system
behaviors.
Fig. 8. Illustration of FSM extraction.
the generated FSM. Source code branching (e.g. IF, SWITCH
statements, etc) and loops (e.g. FOR and WHILE statements,
etc) are also modeled and represent branching and loops in
the corresponding FSM.
It is important to notice that the obtained FSMs actually
model over-approximation of the possible behaviors of the
system. This is partly due to the fact that data is not taken into
account in the extraction process. Considering the example
of Figure 8 again, it may be the case that method3 always
returns True. This would mean that states 4 and 5 of the FSM
in Figure 8(b) would never be reached. Detecting such things
would require extra analyses which are out of the scope of
this paper.
B. System Instrumentation
As illustrated in Figure 3, our approach relies on the use
of a supervisor that can observe the behavior of the system
and after each observed sequence provides a set of allowed
events. In this section, we illustrate how this mechanism can
be implemented through the use of code instrumentation. First
of all, as described in Section II-B, the supervisor can be seen
as a function that given a sequence of events s returns the set
of allowed events after this sequence. Implementing such a
method is straightforward whenever a FSM of the supervisor
is available. If q represents the state of the FSM reached after
sequence s, then the set of allowed events after s corresponds
to the reachable events from q, i.e. δ(q).
Figure 9 illustrates how code can be instrumented in order
to implement the control loop presented in Figure 3. The un-
derlying principle of the approach is that the function encoded
by the supervisor is used when a method is called in order to
decide if its body should be executed. Not every method may
be instrumented and not all the instrumented methods may be
controlled. For instance, preventing the execution of a method
body for a method which must return some value is an issue
as this value may be needed. One approach to this issue is
6void m()
  {
   ...
   method body
   ...
  }
Static Class Supervisor
 {
 FSM supervisor = new FSM(openFile(supModel));
 State currentState;
 boolean accepts(Method m){...}
 }
insertBefore("if !(supervisor.accepts(m)) return;")
Initially
implemented
classes
Controller class
automatically
added
Fig. 9. Illustration of code instrumentation.
to only consider controlling methods that do not return any
value. This point is detailed further in Section V.
In this work, we consider Java applications and introduce
a new Supervisor class to the system. This class is declared
as static and possess two attributes: an FSM representing the
model of the supervisor and a state representing the current
state of this model. This FSM is instantiated from a “patch”
file containing the model of the supervisor. The current state
is instantiated as the initial state of this FSM. The Supervisor
class also contains a static method called Supervisor.accepts
which takes a string representing a method name (e.g. m) and
returns a boolean. The value of this boolean is true if and only
if the model of the supervisor encodes that m can be triggered
from the current state of the model. Whenever the execution
of m is authorized, Supervisor.accepts also updates the current
state of the model as well as the sequence of observed method
calls.
Therefore, implementing the monitoring of method calls
and updating at runtime the model of the current state of the
model of supervisor accordingly can simply be achieved by
systematically instrumenting each method m with:
Supervisor.accepts(m); (2)
With this approach whenever an authorized method is called
at runtime, it is indicated to the Supervisor class which can
then update the current state of the model.
The inserted code can also be augmented so that the body
of unauthorized method calls are not executed. This should
only be done for controllable methods while uncontrollable
methods will be instrumented as described in Statement (2). In
this work, we assume that only methods that do not return any
value can be controllable. This allows for instance to prevent
the execution of methods associated to graphical elements, e.g.
the actionPerformed methods associated to Swing buttons do
not return any value. Controllable methods are instrumented
as follows:
If (!Supervisor.accepts(m)) return; (3)
Statement (3) indicates that whenever a method m is called,
it is first checked if calling this method from the current state
of the supervisor model is authorized. If it is the case, then
the body of the method is executed normally and the current
Fig. 10. A basic calculator example.
state is updated. If the method call is not authorized then the
method exits before its body is executed.
Method Supervisor.accepts and the instrumentation pre-
sented in Statements (2) and (3) make it possible for a
supervisor modeled by an FSM to control a Java program as
illustrated in Figure 3.
Although source code instrumentation is considered in our
approach, other techniques can be enviseaged in order for the
supervisor to interact with the system. For instance, for Java
programs, it is possible to instrument the Bytecode, leaving
the source code unchanged. Javassist ([20]) is a library that
makes it possible to instrument the Bytecode, offering entry
points to perform actions when a method is called.
Javassist offers many facilities to instrument Bytecode
among which the insertBefore method. Given a method m of
a Java program, the insertBefore method allows to insert Java
code that will be executed before the body of m.
Javassist also makes it possible to add new .class files
to some existing program and to refer to the corresponding
classes in the code inserted through the insertBefore.
IV. EXAMPLE
In this subsection, we illustrate the applicability of supervi-
sory control principles to a concrete example. We consider
a basic calculator with a graphical interface, presented in
Figure 10.
In this subsection we consider two examples. First Exam-
ple 2 shows how supervisory control techniques can be applied
to control the application so that specific sequences of events
that lead to some vulnerabilities cannot be executed. More
specifically, Example 2 considers the case where the system
does not handle some division by zero exception.
We also consider Example 3 where it is assumed that it
is possible to edit the text field of the calculator. In this
example, supervisory control is used to prevent possible BOF
vulnerabilities.
Example 2: Figure 11 represents a Finite State Machine
modeling the behaviors of the calculator. Each event of the
Finite State Machine represents the processing associated to
each of the button of the interface presented of Figure 10. For
instance, event ’0’ represents the call of the method activated
when button ’0’ is pressed. i.e. label ’0’ represents the call of
the method that is triggered when the graphical event repre-
senting the click of button ’0’ is caught. All the other events
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0,..,9clear
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+,-,*,/
Fig. 11. A model of the calculator behaviors.
except for ’arithmeticException’ (i.e. 1, . . . , 9,+,−, ∗, / and
’clear’) represent the method call activated when the corre-
sponding button is pressed. Event ’arithmeticException’ rep-
resents the raise of an exception corresponding to division by
zero in this example. Labels of the form All \X in Figure 11
represents the set of all events except for the ones belonging
to X . The FSM of Figure 11 encodes the possible visible
behaviors of the calculator and makes it possible to determine
the behaviors possibly following after a given sequence of
events. For instance, if a user presses buttons ’1’, then ’/’,
and then ’0’, then we can infer that the FSM of Figure 11
started from state 0 and went through states 1, then 2 and
finally 3. From this state the event arithmeticException cannot
be triggered but it might be triggered if the user then presses
any of the buttons ’+’, ’-’, ’/’, ’*’ and ’=’.
The Finite State Machine presented in Figure 12 encodes
the set of all possible behaviors that do not contain sequences
of ’/’ followed by sequences of ’0’ and then followed by ’=’.
Intuitively, this control objective aims to prevent the execution
of sequences in which ’/’ can be directly followed by ’0’
and then ’=’. It is assume here that the control objective
is manually designed after the observation of an unexpected
exception being raised. In some cases however, the control
objective can be automated generated ([21]). This type of
control objective can be derived from observation of a runtime
exception whenever such a sequence occurs. Note that in this
example, it is assumed that dividing by zero only leads to an
exception whenever button ’=’ is pressed. This can result from
an implementation choice of the calculator where processing
of the operands is only performed when ’=’ is pressed.
For illustration purposes, we consider here that the actions
related to the buttons of the interface of Figure 10 correspond
to the controllable events except for button ’=’, i.e Σu = {=}.
Figure 13 represents the supervisor obtained using classical
supervisory control algorithm as presented in [11]. According
All \ {/}
/
All \ {0,=}
0
0
/
All \ {0,/}
Fig. 12. A possible control objective expressing 0 must not occur just after
’/’.
to this supervisor, occurrences of ’arithmeticException’ cannot
occur after a division by zero. As division by zero is the only
condition for raising this exception in the system, combining
the supervisor with the system prevent any occurrence of
’arithmeticException’.
0,..,9
0,..,9,=
+,-,*
0,..,9
All \ {0,..,9}
clear
0,..,9clear
clear
=
+,-,*,/,=
+,-,*,/
/
1,..,9
+,-,*
clear
Fig. 13. A supervisor preventing division by zero.
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Example 3: We now consider that the system under consid-
eration follows a client-server architecture and that Figure 10
represents the client side of the application and that actual
computations are performed on the server side. Server side
computations are only called from the client side when press-
ing one of the operation button (i.e. +,-,*,/) or the ’=’ button.
It is also assumed that the text field of the calculator can
be edited and that values can therefore be entered through
a keyboard. Figure 14 represents a Finite State Machine
modeling the behaviors of the calculator in this case. The FSM
is quite similar to the one of Figure 11, except that a new event
is introduced, i.e. ’focusGained’, modeling that the text field
has received focus and is ready for edition.
For the sake of argumentation, we assume here that there is
a possible BOF vulnerability due to the possibility of editing
8the calculator text field. There may be indeed no control on
neither the client nor the server side in order to avoid buffer
overflow.
0,..,9
0,..,9,=
+,-,*
0,..,9
All \ {0,..,9}
clear
0,..,9
=
All \ {0,..,9,clear,=}
+,-,*,/
focusGained
focusGained
focusGained
0,..,9
0,..,9,=
+,-,*,/
focusGained
+,-,*,/
clear
clear
clear
Clear
Fig. 14. A model of the calculator where the text field can be edited.
Figure 15 represents a possible control objective which aims
to avoid buffer overflow issue for the calculator. This control
objective states that only events related to digit buttons (i.e.
0,..,9) and the clear button can be executed after the focus
has been gained by the calculator text field. Pressing one of
these buttons overwrites the content of the text field. Moreover,
this control objective indicates that no more than 3 digits can
be entered in the calculator3. Therefore enforcing this control
objective on the system ensures that no numbers of more than
3 digits can be sent on the server side to be processed, thus
avoiding buffer overflows.
Using the classical SupCont supervisory control algorithm
again, a maximal supervisor is provided in Figure 16. This
FSM corresponds to the one representing the calculator be-
haviors in Figure 11, except that:
• events =,+,−, ∗, / cannot occur anymore after the cal-
culator text field gained focus, unless some digit buttons
or the clear button have been pressed first.
• only numbers with no more than 3 digits can be entered
and processed by the calculator.
3This number is only kept to 3 to ensure the readibility of the figures in
this example. Higher numbers could be used depending on what bound is
suitable to avoid a buffer overflow.
All \ {focusGained,0..,9}
focusGained
0,..,9
0,..,9
0,..,9
0,..,9
+,-,*,/,=,clear
clear
focusGained
Fig. 15. A control objective to avoid buffer overflow issue for the calculator.
0,..,9
+,-,*
0,..,9
All \ {0,..,9}
clear
=
All \ {0,..,9,clear,=}
+,-,*,/
focusGained
focusGained
focusGained
0,..,9
0,..,9
focusGained
clear
clear
clear
Clear
0,..,9
0,..,9
focusGained
focusGained
+,-,*,/,clear
0,..,9
0,..,9
focusGained
+,-,*,/
Fig. 16. A supervisor preventing the processing of strings input into the
calculator text field.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presents an approach for controlling software
execution after the system has been deployed. The approach
consists of instrumenting the program before it is deployed so
that it is ready to interact with a supervisor at a later stage,
e.g. when some fault or vulnerability has been discovered.
Section IV shows example where supervisory can be applied
to prevent sequences that may exhibit runtime exception or
vulnerability issues. In these examples, some FSM modeling
the system and control objectives are provided. These FSMs
represent over-approximations of the behaviors of the system
to be controlled. It is to be noticed that the less accurate the
approximation is, the more brutal the supervisor can be. This
can however be compensated by the control objective.
Another point of discussion is related to the notion of
controllable and uncontrollable events. As pointed out in Sec-
tion III-B, one may consider that some methods should be con-
trollable because of their structure, e.g. they return some value
and preventing the excution of their body is not appropriate.
The architecture of the system is another criteria that should
be taken into account for decision as to what method should
be controllable. In case of a client-server architecture, one may
decide to control the client side, the server side, or both. This
choice would impact on the event controllability. Considering
Example IV again, it is there assumed that only buttons are
controllable, allowing for a supervision of the client only. This
approach is interesting as graphical interface components are
good candidates for controlling the user interaction with the
system. Such an approach also allows for customized control
9where the control objective could vary depending on the user,
i.e. different supervisors may apply to different instances of
the client application.
On the other hand, it may be safer to control the server
application instead of the client one. This would ensure that
whatever action is being performed on the client side, the
control objective is ensured on the server side. This may be of
interest when there is a risk that the supervisor can be disabled
or modify on the client application.
Control can also be applied globally on both the client and
server applications, providing the strength of both previously
mentioned approaches. Another approach would be to focus
on the communication protocol between the client and server
application.
Finally, only method calls are considered in our model.
Adding information about the values of the program variables
to our models would improve the quality of the control being
applied to the system. However, this may considerably increase
the complexity of analyzing such models. Ongoing work from
our European Research Project FastFIX ([1]) will study this
aspect and evaluate the feasibility of our methodology on
industrial application.
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